



The BBC's annual Correspondents Look Foward programme has, characteristically, nothing to say about Central and Eastern Europe. It is now a backwater of global politics, seemingly. Even Russia barely gets a mention and the programme peters out with a self-indulgent discussion of the World Cup.
The Warsaw Voice reports the latest political shenanigans around the law restricting Poland's currently wide ranging entitlements to early retirement. President Kaczynski has vetoed the bill, putting the small post-communist social democratic left in a (for once) important position: their votes would be needed by the liberal-peasant coalition govenment to overide the veto. Having looked like they might initially play the role of defenders of social welfare and big and early pensions, they now seem likely to opt for the role of modernizing opponents of the conservative-national right and help overturn the veto. Well, this is Poland, after all.
The Warsaw Voice reports protests by trade unionists over the scaling back of early retirement schemes - one of the last remaining special social policies of the transition period intended - some say - to dampen down the possibilty of Latin American style social unrest. Probably the political system is stable enough, the government popular enough, the coffers empty enough and workers in declining heavy industies weak enough to allow this to happen now. Public sector workers may have few unpleasant surprises up their sleeves, but as events last year in Bulgaria showed, no one cares that much if the education system grinds to halt.
The long shadow of the communist-era even reaches the ice cream stall at the Luhačovice municipal lido. My daughter wants a
Friday morning found me sitting in the slightly faded elegance of a high ceilinged Georgian drawing room in the Polish Embassy in
Jacek Kucharczyk of the Warsaw-based Institute of Public Affairs (ISP) offered a slightly more sanguine assessment: there had, he suggests, been a genuine shift in Polish public opinion following accession and the pre-accession period he suggests would in hindsight come to be seen as the high watermark for radical eurosceptic parties like Self-Defence and the LPR; the crushing victory of Civic Platform was significant both as expressing a desire to express Polish Europeaness and national identity in new terms and in bringing to power a europhile liberal-peasant coalition with roots in co-operation in the European Parliament as part of the sprawling EPP faction; Europe was, moreover, an issue too lacking in salience to ever re-engage Polish voters, even assuming it ever engaged them in the first place (the rise of eurosceptic parties being, as several questioners later pointed out, more a facet of domestic issues, rather than concern over the EU per se). Simona Guerra then concluded the session with some discussion of focus research among students in Poland on attitudes to the EU: there are interesting regional variations and at aggregate level interesting correlations between Catholicism/religiosity and support the EU, most practicing Catholics tending to favour integration.
An interesting discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities between Britain’s Liberal Democrats and Poland’s Civic Platform
Meanwhile, before you can say ‘Jaroslaw Kaczynski’ there is a (well attended)roundtable on the Polish elections at SSEES, where Aleks Szczerbiak struck an interestingly sceptical note about the durability of Civic Platform’s victory. Donald Tusk’s party has, he thinks, perhaps put together an unfeasibly broad electoral coalition based more of rejection of the incumbent government than support for a liberal-consevative centre-right. It had hoovered up votes of those who incline to more to the post-communist left, which was wrongfooted by the speed with which early election were called. Moreover, the Kaczynski’s Law and Justice (PiS) party remained, he thought, remained a poweful force having gained both voters and voters in a way not wholly reducible to taking over the electorate pole-axed radical parties Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families (LPR) (cut loose by Radio Marija, which backed PiS). PiS, it was suggested also had a powerful and coherent conservative-national narrative based on the project of a ‘Fourth Republic’ cleansed of the pervasive influence of an informal establishment (Uklad) of left-liberal communists-turned-capitalists and shady characters. Tusk’s PO, by contrast, travelled rather light in terms of ideology stressing modernity and decency. The idea of young, educated migrants and the emergeny middle classes turned on conservative, rural Poland was something of a myth: only about 30, 000 of the 750, 000 Poles in the UK voted and thir liberal votes were probably counted out by the Law and Justice inclined ballots of a similar number of Polish Americans in the US. Moreover, any coalition with the Peasant Party (PSL) would be tricky, given the latter’s inclination to play hardball on all kinds of issues, ruthless extract policy concessions for their rural base and use state posts as patronage resources to sutain their party (Civic Platform want to decentalize and clean up, but I wondered can you really build or sustain a party in CEE these days without a dose of clientelism and patronage?). Civic Platform and its new government might like so many previous Polish election winners fall apart all too soon.
Others speakers, including my SSEES economist colleague Tomasz Mickiewicz who doubles as astute poltical analyst, saw PO as having better prospects. There was ample scope for privatization – about 20% of Poland’s GDP is still in the state sector, second only to Russia among post-communist states, apparently. (Ironically, Law and Justice’s Gaullist dislike of privatizition had deprived it of resources for its social spending commitments). Moreover, its rhetoric of European modernity and a free market with functional welfare, he thought had been effective – the party had managed to reinvent itself as something else other than a elite, secular liberal party indifferent to national tradition and religion. Mass emigration to the UK and Ireland had given Poles a clear sense of just how this could work – migrants might not count much electorally, but they were cultural vectors for change in small town and rural Poland, perhaps enabling PO to puncture PiS economically populist warnings of impoverishment all round. Apparently, some Poles also see Ireland's political model of two (broadly speaking) right-wing parties and a rump social democratic left as as desirable as its Celtic Tiger economic policies. Ireland's chronic patronage and clientelism probably also offer an (unintended) parallel...
Results from Poland’s electoral commission reveal a complete slaughter of minor parties: not only are once medium-sized formations like Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families cut down to extra-parliamentary minows, the niche fringe groups of (occasional) interest to me barely register: the Women’s Party comes in at a mere 0.27% and the pensioners’ party seems not even to have made it onto the ballot, although I note that an outfit called the Labour Party picked up 1%. Is this the country that put the Friends of Beer party into parliament?
So, ‘early’ (actually much delayed) exit polls suggest, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) has been clobbered by the market liberal-conservative modernisers of Civic Platform (OP), predicted to clock-up a huge 43-45% of the vote compared to a mere low thirtysomething for PiS. If true, OP might even be able to form a single party majority government, although thinking back to how wrong the Czech exit polls were last year Donald Tusk would do well to put the champagne on ice and start thinking about who potential coalition partners might be. With the exception of the Peasant Party, all the usual minor parties (Self-Defence, League of Polish Families etc) seem to have been wiped out, with niche parties that interested me so much (Women’s Party, Pensioners’ Party etc) not getting a look in. The Polish post-communist left, however, seems set to demonstrate its usual resilience in the face of defeat and establish itself a medium-sized third force. However, the numbers actually shape up what is striking is how very polarised these elections are despite the presence of a PR electoral system in theory reasonably conducive to small parties - a tendency also very visible in Czech elections last year and, of course, long established in Hungary whose mixed half PR/half-first past-the-post system offers strong incentives for two-party/bloc politics. An additional factor may be the role of the media in 'presidentializing' and polarising party politics. The Tusk-Kaczynski TV debate (which Tusk won convincingly) appears to have played a major role in outcome both in the sense of exlaining who won and in reflecting and reinforcing a sense that the election was basically a two horse race. The Czech series of pre-election Paroubek-Topolánek TV duels last year, althought there was no clear winner, seems to have had the same polarizing effect,boosting the two main parties' vote at the expense of more minor playes
Just as a follow up to my earlier post on CEE politicians fishing for ex-pat votes, I see the latest issue of the Warsaw Voice carries the following story by Andrzej Ratajczyk:
In a sign of the times, the leader of Polish right-wing liberal-conservative Civic Platform party, Donald Tusk - currently vying for electoral supremacy with the more conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party of the Kaczynski twins - dropped in a branch of Tesco in West London, where according to Gazeta Wyborcza (as far as I can understand it) he stepped into a blaze of flash photography and ‘caused a sensation’. He wasn’t there to do a spot of shopping, but to open a counter selling Polish groceries and - more significantly - follows in the footsteps of pro-market politicians from other EU countries, who have beaten a path abroad to campaign for the votes of a new young, well educated economic diasporas, who have turned their backs on high unemployment or low wages to seek better opportunities elsewhere. Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, addressed a rally of some 2000 French expats in London during his successful presidential campaign and Romanian politicians were, apparently, out and about in numbers before the last elections in Spain, where there are tens of thousands of Romanian guestworkers
Meanwhile, the surprise package of the Polish elections seems not to be the pernsioners party, but the newly formed Women’s Party (Partia Kobiet), whose Polish language website can be found here. Its founders semi-nude campaign posters have attracted the requisitie amount of outrage from the Church and (crucially) media coverage, including a report in The Times. Despite this media savvy crashing of the headlines, the party seems a politically very serious initiative and, interestingly, differs from women’s parties elsewhere in post-communist Europe in being more overtly feminist and intelligenstsia-based and less based on women’s organisations with roots in the old regime and preoccupied with fighting rearguard actions to defend socialist-era welfare provisions. Newness, media coverage, the backing of female celebrities and response to issues not well addressed in Poland's male-dominated political class may add to a recipe for political success for the Partia Kobiet, which (on a reported 3%) is positioned not too far off the 5% threshold needed to entered parliament and - more crucially - to overcome potential voters' concerned that a vote for the PK might be wasted on a non-parliamentary also-ran.
Polish politics moves so fast. One minute the ultra-Catholic League of Polish Families are allying with populist Self-Defence (PiS), the next thing they have teamed up with dissident MPs for the ruling Law and Justice party and – my SSEES colleague tells during a breath of fresh air during out staff awayday – the notionally liberatarian Union for Real Politics. As in 2001 the election is a ding-dong battle between populist inclined conservative nationalist PiS and the centre-right Civic Platform (OP), who are liberal-conservative bloc loosely in ther mould of the Czech ODS (although this time they are keeping stum about that belief in flat taxation, it seems, and stressing PiS authoritarian leanings and apparent abuse of the anti-corruption agency and police. Opinion polls going up and down with OP and PiS variously in the lead with each getting (usually) around 30% of the poll. Small parties have been squeezed. The remnants of the once mightly post-communist left have formed a Hungarian style left-liberal coalition (LiD) with the Democrats, descendants of the ex-dissident Freedom Union who crashed out of parliament in 2005. This grouping seems set to hang on in parliament as a minor party with around 10 per cent of the poll. The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) also seem set to do badly, with polls I have seen reported putting them on 3-5 per cent, suggesting they could go the same way. Indeed, in one poll, they were reportedly barely ahead of the National Pensioners Party (KPEiR) which registered a respectabe 3%. There is also a Women’s Party standing (1.6%). Both the result and the government seem, frankly, anyone’s guesss and, as ever, Polish elections seems set to generate surprises. Who knows it might even be worth putting a few zlotys on the Pensioners.
Aktualne.cz notes the parallels between the position of the minority centre-right Czech and Polish centre-right governments in managing junior partners mired in corruption allegations. Polish PM Jaroslaw Kaczynski can happily give populist Agriculture Minister and Deputy PM Andrzej Lepper the boot, whereas Czech PM Miroslav Topolánek has to hang on for dear life to Christian Democrat leader, Minsiter of Local Development and Deputy PM, Jiří Čunek. Despite the general respectability of the Czech Christian Democrats compared to Lepper’s radical Self-Defence party, Čunek (a former mayor elected to the Senate last year) is one a of a new breed of Czech populists with a background in communal politics, who have discovered that brutal remarks directed towards the Roma minority are something of a vote winner – perhaps because with the collapse of the Czech far-right as a national electoral force whose stock in trade they were they have lost their taboo status. The Czech Republic’s having safely joined the EU probably adds to this as well.
Well, a better informed colleague tells me, the LiS grouping is more of a fox driven to ground than a powerful populist predator likely to gobble up the voters of more mainstream parties - the League of Polish Families has dire poll ratings of 2-3% and Self-Defence is poised uncertainly over the 5% threshold needed to enter parliament. The whole project is more of a short-term electoral bloc in the best traditions of Polish pre-election hocus pocus than a true party merger. Both parties will apparently keep their own organizational structures and simply bolt on some kind of co-ordinating bodies. This given that both party leaders are also likely to keep their egos intact, suggests they will probably not keep the whole show on the road for very long.
You could have knocked me down with a feather when I read (in the Slovak) press that Poland’s ultra-Catholic League of Polish Families (LPR) and raucous agrarian populist Self-Defence are to merge into a single grouping to be known as League and Self-Defence (LiS). This cumbersome title allows a punning acronym as ‘lis’ is the Polish for ‘fox’ and the new grouping was launched by Self-Defence’s Andrzej Lepper and the rather younger, smoother LPR leader Roman Giertych holding a cuddly toy fox, which vaguely reminded me of the mascot of the Czech mortgage company ČMSS (see below) or the ever popular British children's TV character, Basil Brush.
conservative minority coalition government headed by Law and Justice Party of terrible twins Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski and, presumably, to the impending prospect of early elections where the LiS alliance might produce electoral gains (although the dividends of merged blocs are not always as high as their founders imagine). Although both Self-Defence and LPR are anti-liberal, anti-EU and perhaps more rural than urban, they strike me as rather unlikely bedfellows given the rather different social mileux they spring from and the fact that Self-Defence seemed to embody a fairly secular economic populism and relatively agnostic line on decommunization. Lepper’s comment that both groups would ‘retain their identity’ also seemed to contradict the sense of a merger, the organizational and financial mechanics of which would, given the best will in the world, be inevitably be tricky
Despite the conventional wisdom about flat, stunted civic societies in Central and Eastern Europe, as Petr Kopecký and Cas Mudde suggested in an excellent edited collection a few years ago (Uncivil Society?, Routledge, 2002) waves of civic mobilization do break over CEE fairly regularly. These days, more often than not, however, they are semi-orchestrated by liberal and right-wing parties trying to depict opponents as authoritarian throwbacks threatening democracy against whom a 'new 1989' is needed. The militant right-wing Hungarian protest culture - which first emerged in full view with the founding of the 'civic circles' movement in 2002 after the right narrowly lost elections and has gained a new lease of life with the Hungarian Socialists PM's unwisely candid remarks that he had lied to win the election about a 'fucked up' economy (A European Commission report confirms Hungary has the worst fiscal stats in the EU - those other neo-liberal refuseniks, the Czechs and Slovenes do quite badly as well).